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BOOK REVIEW
Ina Merdjanova, ed. Women and Religiosity in Orthodox Christianity (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2021), 287 + xix pp., $35, ISBN: 9780823298617.
Reviewed by: Nadieszda Kizenko, professor, University at Albany
This collected volume amply fulfills the “Orthodoxy and Contemporary Thought”
series mandate. Given its title, one would expect it to focus narrowly on issues of women and
religiosity. While it does indeed offer fascinating glimpses of women engaging with a patriarchal
religious tradition, it provides something far broader. Through the prism of women’s experiences,
the book (with specialists in theology, anthropology, ethnography, history, sociology, and politics)
shines a light on issues facing many Orthodox Christians: post-communist transformations, the
challenge of global economic crisis, digitalization, media, underground movements seeking to
pursue ‘authentic’ religion outside a ‘corrupt’ state church, revived monasticism, urban vs rural
practices, environmental issues, Church-state-people relations, and national identity. With its deep
look at 20th and 21st century changes in Orthodox religious life, this book should be required
reading for anyone interested in religion and modernity.
One core issue is the variety of national religious and political experiences. Six of the
countries described here—Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia—all experienced
communism’s attack on religious institutions and practices. They experienced it to very different
degrees. Monasticism and rural life, both ground out so cruelly in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus in
the 1920s and 1930s, could not only survive but apparently thrive in countries that became
communist only after World War II. In fact, as Maria Bucur (“Gender and Religiosity in
Communist Romania: Continuity and Change”) and Milica Bakić-Hayden (“Doubly Neglected:
Histories of Women Monastics in the Serbian Orthodox Church”) show for Romania and Serbia,
respectively, despite forced laicization in some areas, the number of nuns and convents in both
countries went up during the communist period: as farms were collectivized, rural women could
see convent life as offering real opportunities (a “peasantization” of monasticism familiar, as Scott
Kenworthy and William Wagner have shown, from pre-revolutionary Russia and Ukraine). Being
able to see and visit working monasteries meant that rural girls could, and did, think of monasticism
as a real option: female monasticism (though not male monasticism) in fact increased in Romania
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1938-1957. For some groups, the continuity under communism was more remarkable than the
break.
Communism did bring some changes shared across countries. Religion’s being relegated
to “folk” custom meant its partial museumification, but also allowed it to survive. Religious
practice moved outside the now-closed church and into the home, with laywomen rather than
clerics becoming acknowledged virtuosi and religious specialists. In Georgia, discussed by
Ketevan Gurchiani (“Women and the Georgian Orthodox Church”), as in Romania, Serbia,
Bulgaria, and Russia, women took charge of enforcing moral codes, sartorial habits, death rites,
and religious food rituals—only to have these practices later dismissed by an eagerly reinstitutionalizing, re-clericalizing (and hence re-masculinizing) post-communist Church as being
irrelevant or nonessential. Seemingly unique to Georgia are the contemporary clairvoyants and
fortunetellers who incorporate Orthodox elements into their rituals: they display icons and images
of Patriarch Ilia II, they tell their clients to also consult priests, they do not work during Lent. This
suggests that what the population valued under communism and continues to value now is
Orthodox expertise, authenticity, and results (someone knowing “the ways of the ancestors”),
rather than sacramentality as such.
Given that Orthodox hierarchs worked together with authorities in the communist countries
studied here, the female expert practitioners’ lack of clerical affiliation may have bolstered their
credibility, rather than detracting from it. The Gagauz (Turkish-speaking Orthodox) followers of
the charismatic elder Inokentie in Soviet Moldova described by James Kapalo (“Women and
Orthodox Dissent: The Case of the Archangelist Underground Movement in Soviet Moldovia”),
for example, saved objects rescued from closed churches into private homes, resisted the new
calendar, and insisted that, unlike the establishment Church which had caved to lax or atheist
authorities, they (despite accusations of “sectarianism”) were the true Orthodox, doing nothing
different than what was done in normal Orthodox monasteries, above all keeping all four Church
fasts as well as Wednesdays and Fridays. Like the female followers of Ioann of Kronstadt—and
not unlike the Old Believers centuries earlier—this Archangelist underground movement rejected
the roles of bride, mother, and housewife, becoming underground missionaries. The Khrushchevera church closings of the 1950s-1960s—another element common to communist countries—
spread their influence even further. Faced with churches in the pay of the state and charismatic
virtuosi, the population had to determine whether maintaining access to power (as clerics could if
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they collaborated with the state) was more important than maintaining rigor and “purity” (as
female virtuosi with no access to institutional power could). In Romania and Moldova, as Maria
Bucur shows, collaboration meant that the Orthodox Church could not only attain a stable position
but also seize Greek Catholic properties, thus getting a competitive advantage in what had been a
multi-confessional society.
In Bulgaria (described by Ina Merdjanova), collaboration and internal scandal did real
damage to “the most discredited institutional church.” As in Romania, the state paid Orthodox
clerical salaries before and after communism. When complicit church leaders refrained from
criticizing such state policies as 1990s neoliberal economic restructuring and its disastrous social
costs, they lost much of their spiritual credibility. Clerics hurling recriminations and
excommunications at one another because of ties with the former regime further discredited
themselves in the eyes of faithful: now, only 15% of Bulgarians (as opposed to 59% of Greeks and
50% of Romanians and Georgians) see religion as “very important.” If one takes monasticism as
an indicator of especially earnest Orthodox piety, Bulgaria is again a negative outlier: although (as
in other countries) female monastics in Bulgaria outnumbered male monastics both under and after
communism, the number of monastics overall fell by one-third after communism. However,
despite its lack of public trust in many areas, the Bulgarian Church can still muster powerful
support when it insists on traditional gender roles: in 2018, by focusing debate on concept of
gender identity, it blocked the passing of the Council of Europe Convention against domestic
violence and violence against women. With all this, it comes as a surprise to learn that since 1989,
more women have studied Orthodox theology in Bulgarian universities than have men—but there
are no jobs for them afterwards, except perhaps as administrative staff in the Bulgarian Holy
Synod.
Such opportunities for women’s Church employment seem strongest in Russia. Detelina
Tocheva (“Lay Women and the Transformation of Orthodox Christianity in Russia”) explores the
full range of laywomen who work for the Russian Orthodox Church as parish schoolteachers,
pilgrimage and event organizers, choir directors, journalists, and PR specialists. Bookkeeping,
mentioned as a female Church profession in all the post-communist countries here, is a particularly
fascinating invisible yet vital occupation, as its numbers define the Church economy at every level,
including how much a parish should contribute to central coffers. The Church-as-employer offers
women job opportunities, social integration, and social recognition. Most surprising is that in
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Russia, being a skilled female Church professional has normalized the previously stigmatized
status of being a single mother (one-third of all Russian Orthodox mothers are single, far higher
than other Orthodox countries). Has this, however, “generated a tentative cultural turn?” At times
of peace and prosperity (as when this book was written), perhaps. The example of Greece,
however, shows that a time of crisis, women’s gains in the Church can vanish. Moreover, as in
Orthodox Judaism, it is perfectly possible for women’s “practical” activity to reinforce traditional
gender roles. This seems to be the position of the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy with its
continued emphasis on the “traditional” family (uniquely for Orthodox countries in the economic
and political turmoil of the 1990s, the last Romanov family were presented as an ideal). Official
Church documents and declarations, such as the 2000 Basis of Social Concept, warn women
against neglecting motherhood in pursuit of career—but offer no guidance for how women should
combine demanding jobs with motherhood. What use is a “tacit cultural, though not doctrinal, turn
in the Church,” if it does not trickle upwards into theology? Can software ever become hardwiring?
Different answers to these questions come from countries with significant Orthodox
populations who have not experienced communist persecution. Finland, existing as it does on the
borders of both the Russian Federation (earlier the USSR) and the EU, as Helena Kupari and
Tatiana Tiaynen-Qadir (“Women as Agents of Glocalization in the Orthodox Church of Finland”)
show, is unique in combining Finnish, Karelian, Russian, and Ukrainian Orthodox identities and
in having Orthodoxy be an official church, but a minority one. Their article includes the impact of
transnationalization and increased migration within Europe, something relevant to many Orthodox
populations in the Americas as well. By studying two different generations (older Karelian women
dislocated from the majority Orthodox eastern part of Finland, younger women of both Finnish
and migrant Russian/Ukrainian backgrounds), they also focus less on politics and more on such
“non-cognitive” experiences as the liturgy, domestic, and parish activities, as well as tensions
between different “waves” of emigration, which emerges in everything from how one dresses to
competition over children’s Christmas pageants (again something shared by Orthodox populations
worldwide). It emerges, for example, that for older generations, hearing the tunes one remembers
from childhood is more important than the language in which one hears them. Similarly, key icons
(the Karelian Mary, the Evacuee Christ distributed to refugees) evoke and soften memories of
displacement. In a social context where same-sex marriages are not only legal but held up as a
positive value and where women in the largest (Lutheran) state church can be ordained, Finnish
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Orthodox women argue that the veneration of Mary and female saints makes Orthodoxy more
inclusive—raising the question of what kind of inclusiveness (ordination and power versus
symbolism) is in fact more important.
At the different ends of the circle—and showing the range of Orthodox women’s
experiences—are Greece (discussed by Eleni Sotiriou, “Women and Greek Orthodoxy in the
Twenty-First Century: Charting Elements of Change”) and the United States (Sarah RiccardiSwartz, “Head Coverings, Vaccines, and Gender Politics: Contentious Topics among Orthodox
Christian Women in US-based Digital Spaces”). Greece is unique among historically Orthodox
countries in having no politically enforced secularization and enjoying a stable position since
establishment of modern Greek state in the early nineteenth century. Precisely because of this
stability, the 2008 economic crisis came as such a shock, bringing poverty, violence, the sudden
reversion to a promotion of traditional gender roles (women were blamed as being spendthrifts),
and the consequent rebellion of women under forty. As Sotiriou shows, sociological analyses must
include both age and gender as factors. When Greece was prosperous, women could advance;
when things went bad, it was men, and especially young men, who had to be protected. Indeed,
young men felt that they were the prime victims of the crisis and started joining the clergy in record
numbers (a threefold increase), going to church more, and even starting to participate in Sunday
school teaching and philanthropy. Elderism and prophecy became stronger—and were also limited
to men. This article thus underscores the need for truly gendered studies of Orthodoxy, including
what Orthodoxy means for lay men, who have been mostly neglected in the scholarship. Faced
with the Church’s support of traditional gender values and insistence on domestication of women,
younger women rebelled, in some cases stopping the baptism of their children. It will be curious
to see what the long-term impacts of this crisis (not to speak of Covid and its impact on tourism)
will be on gender patterns in Greek Orthodoxy.
Two areas where women’s Orthodox experience does thrive in Greece are monasticism
and the digital sphere. Sotiriou’s Greek convents are a far cry from the rural profile of Romania
and Greece: their international nuns (drawing in large measure on converts from abroad—
something unheard-of in male Greek monasteries) have open visiting hours, take part in
international conferences, and write about monasticism as the ideal way of pursuing spiritual
equality and perfection: free from male custodianship and housework, nuns can work to sustain
their own communities, which includes ecology and sustainable organic farming (it would be
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curious to know if nuns also produce liturgical texts like the eco-molieben liturgical service for the
Church New Year). Sotiriou also discusses religious female bloggers including a priest’s wife, a
Sunday school teacher (who mostly support male religious authority), and an older, more rigorist,
woman who calls herself a “grandma holy fool” and thus seems more free to criticize both clergy
and the culture of late modernity for its lack of rigor. This digital space allows women to make
their own narratives public and to have more agency and voice (and, literally, more followers) than
they do offline. At first glance, in their insistence on “traditional Orthodox values” they seem a
21st century version of the rigorist Gagauz people. But, as they offer curated copy and musings
rather than individual advice, and as they remain safely anonymous (as opposed to Sister Vassa, a
ROCOR nun based in Vienna with her own podcast), it seems a stretch to call their activity ‘digital
elderism.’
Sarah Riccardi-Swartz examines US women’s digital activity from (mostly conservative)
online communities rather than individual blogs, regarding them as specific, recent form of female
empowerment, though within self-imposed limits. Even before Covid, banned topics included head
coverings, vaccines, and politics. Given that 61% of her survey respondents marked themselves as
being converts, this sample seems a little self-selecting, as does presenting ROCOR voices only
through such converts and women from Russia or Ukraine, thus neglecting the American-born
‘cradle’ Orthodox who are its mainstay (“Coffee with Sister Vassa” and the Axia women’s online
group would be obvious contrasts). But the conservative voices Ricardi-Swartz presents, and their
concerns, are real. Whether the digital realm transforms or supplements women’s religious
experience, and what kinds of community emerge online, and whether this will mean any change
in Orthodoxy’s “hardwiring,” will be key questions for the future.
This volume, in short, is both a welcome contribution to the scholarship on women in
religion and an essential guide for anyone thinking about the present state and future possibilities
of Orthodox Christianity. Its rich footnotes are a superb state-of-the-art resource for anyone
wanting to dig deeper into both theoretical and country-specific literature. As its editor notes, how
Orthodoxy deals with its “woman question” also reflects Orthodoxy’s struggle with human rights
writ large, even as politically conservative Orthodox denounce gender equality as tool of Western
hegemony aiming to destabilize “local [patriarchal] values and traditions” (3). Of course, no book
under 300 pages can cover everything. One would like to see similar attention devoted to such
areas as Arabic-speaking Orthodoxy, Latin America, Belarus, and Ukraine. Still, this book
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captures many Orthodox women as they are in this moment of transition, whether in official
tonsured or liturgical roles (nuns, singers, readers), non-liturgical employees (bookkeepers,
secretaries, managers, journalists, public relations promoters, teachers), “traditional” freelancers
(clairvoyants, healers, curse-removers), or as new “digital” freelancers. No one seriously engaged
with Orthodoxy can ignore either them—or this book.
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